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THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL EXPENSES
IN COMPUTING INCOME TAX
JOHN C. BRUTON*
Doubtless few laymen, when paying a lawyer's bill, unless it is
around the 15th of March, consider whether the payment is deduc-
tible on their income tax. However, whether it is or is not de-
ductible may make a great deal of difference in the cost to them of
the legal services. For example, if a lawyer charges a fee of $1,000
and the client is in a 50%5 income tax bracket, if the amount of the
fee is deductible, the actual cost to the client is $500-in effect
the Federal Government pays the other $500. This matter is im-
portant to clients and to lawyers alike and it should be considered
by the lawyer in arriving at the amount of the fee. Moreover, as
is usually the case, if the fee covers both deductible and non-deduc-
tible items, it should be allocated since if there is no allocation, in
such a case, the entire amount will probably be disallowed.'
Prior to the 1942 Amendments, Section 23 (a) (1) of the Internal
Revenue Code provided that only expenses which were "ordinary
and necessary" in carrying on a "trade or business" could be de-
ducted from gross income. Under this section it was held that a
lawyer's fee, unless in a business transaction, was not deductible
from taxable income. Naturally, all of a taxpayer's income, regard-
less of whether it came from a "trade or business", had to be reported,
but the expenses of producing that income were never deductible
unless they were "ordinary and necessary" and were incurred in
"carrying on a trade or business". Disregarding, for the moment,
the question of whether a particular fee was "ordinary and neces-
sary", was it incurred in a "trade or business"? If so, it was de-
ductible- if not, it was not deductible.
Although the Code specifically provided in Section 24 that a per-
sonal or capital expense was not deductible from ordinary income,
under the decisions of the Court as well as the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue it made no difference whether the expense was
*Member of South Carolina and New York Bar Associations. Member of the firm of
Bruton & Bruton of Columbia, South Carolina. Contributor to legal periodicals.
1. Jordan v. Commissioner, 12 BTA 423; Hoefle v. Commissioner, BTA
memo. op., Dec. 11,277-A; Evans-Winter-Hebb, Inc. v. Commissioner, BTA
memo. op., Dec. 12,592-H-; Smith v. Commissioner, 6 TCM 548.
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personal or was not incurred in a "trade or business" -it was not
deductible in either case.
2
In 1942 the manifest injustice of requiring a tax to be paid on
all income, but allowing the deduction of expenses only if they were
"directly connected with or proximately resulted from the conduct
of a business" was brought forceably to the attention of Congress
as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Higgins v.
Commissioner.3  There the taxpayer had investments of about
twenty-five million dollars, separate and apart from his "trade or
business". While the gross income from this large investment was
taxable, the Court held that the expenses of collecting the income
and managing the property were not deductible as they were not
incurred in a "trade or business".
Promptly after this decision Congress amended Sec. 23 of the
Code to permit the deduction of "ordinary and necessary" expenses
incurred not only in business but also in the production of taxable
income or in the management, conservation or maintenance of pro-
perty held for the production of taxable income. The amendment
is Sec. 23 (a) (2) of the Code and reads as follows:
Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses. -In the case of an in-
dividual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred during the taxable year for the production or collection
of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenande
of property held for the production of income.
This amendment opened the door to the deduction of lawyer's
fees which were not incurred in "trade or business" but which were
necessary for the production of taxable income or the management
of property held for investment. Moreover, the amendment was
followed in 1944 by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Commissioner v. Higgins,4 which greatly enlarged the previous
interpretations of what is an "ordinary and necessary" business ex-
pense, and in 1945 by the case of Bingham Trustees v. Commissioner,5
which held that what constitutes an "ordinary and necessary" expense
was the same, under the Amendment, for non-business as it was
under the old law for a business. The Court said:
2. In McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 57, 65 Sup. Ct. 96, 89 L. Ed.
68 (1944), it was held that campaign expenses of a candidate for public office
were not "ordinary and necessary", and therefore were not deductible. The
Court said that it was unnecessary for it to consider whether or not the ex-
penses were personal.
3. 312 U. S. 212, 61 Sup. Ct. 475, 85 L. Ed. 783 (1941).
4. 320 U. S. 467, 64 Sup. Ct. 249, 88 L Ed. 171 (1944).
5. 325 U. S. 365, 65 Sup. Ct. 1232, 89 L. Ed. 1670 (1945).
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Section 23 (a) (2) is comparable and in pari nateria with
Sec. 23 (a) (1), authorizing the deduction of business or trade
expenses. Such expenses need not relate directly to the pro-
duction of income for the business. It is enough that the ex-
pense, if "ordinary and necessary", is directly connected with
or proximately results from the conduct of the business. Korn-
hauser v. United States, supra, 152-153; Commissioner v. Hein-
inger, supra, 470-471. The effect of Sec. 23 (a) (2) was to
provide for a class of non-business deductions allowed by See.,
23 (a) (1), except for the fact that, since they were not in-
curred in connection with a business, the section made it neces-
sary that they be incurred for the production of income or in.
the management or conservation of property held for the pro-
duction of income.
These cases will be discussed in some detail later in this article,
but it should be noted-here, that under the Bingham decision the
phrase "ordinary and necessary" will be given the same interpreta-
tion in a non-business expense as it will in a business expense.-
There is, -therefore, no longer the taxation of gross incolne, when
that income Was not incurred in a trade or business. Whether the
expense was incurred in a business transaction or-not, if it was
incurred in connection with the production of taxable income or
in the management, etc. of income producing property, it is deduc-
tible unless it was (1) not ordinary and necessary, (2) personal,
(3) capital or (4) violates a public policy.
These possible grounds for denial of the deduction will be sepa-
rately discussed.
1. Ordinary and Necessary:
-What is meant by the phrase "ordinary and necessary"?
The courts have always, in determining what is "ordinary and
necessary", applied the test of what is normal or usual. However,
do they mean normal or usual under the circumstances then pre-
vailing, or do they mean that the events causing those circumstances
to arise must be normal or usual? For example, as applied to a
legal fee, do they mean that it must be normal or usual to employ
an attorney when the taxpayer is arrested, or do they mean that the
reasons why the taxpayer is arrested must be normal or usual?
Here there is no such uniformity. One of the earliest and perhaps
the leading case on the question of when a legal fee is "ordinary
and necessary" is Kornhauser v. United States.6 There the tax,
6. 276 U. S. 145, 48 Sup. Ct. 219, 72 L. Ed. 505 (1928).
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payer had incurred expenses for legal fees in successfully defend-
ing a suit against him for an accounting by his former partner.
The petitioner in that accounting suit alleged that the taxpayer
had collected fees when the partnership was in existence which
he had not turned over to it. The Commissioner refused to allow
the taxpayer to deduct from his gross income the expenses he had
incurred in defending the suit on the ground that such expenses
were not "ordinary and necessary", and were personal. Mr. Korn-
hauser paid the additional tax assessed against him and brought
suit for a refund. The Court of claims upheld the Commissioner
in denying the claim, but the Supreme Court reversed and held
that the expense was "ordinary and necessary" in the operation of
the taxpayer's business and was a proper deduction. The Court said:
And it was an "ordinary and necessary" expense, since a suit
ordinarily and, as a general thing at least, necessarily requires
the employment of counsel and payment of his charges. The
petition is not as definite as it might have been, but from its
allegations, interpreted as the Solicitor General concedes they
may be, it appears that the accounting suit presented the ques-
tion whether the compensation in respect of which the co-part-
ner sought an accounting was for professional services per-
formed by petitioner during the existence of the partnership
or after its termination, the defense to that suit being based
upon the latter alternative. In either view, the compensation
constituted business earnings.
The Kornhauser decision, while widely quoted, was confined to its
facts, and soon came to be of no value as a precedent, except in an
accounting case. The Court said, as has been noted, that ". . . a
suit ordinarily and, as a general thing at least, necessarily requires
the employment of counsel . . ." But this language was evidently
soon forgotten and in both the Bureau and the Courts the matter
was considered from the viewpoint of whether the events leading
up to the suit were "ordinary and necessary". In other words, the
question became one of whether the events requiring the employ-
ment of an attorney were "ordinary and necessary", rather than
whether it was "ordinary and necessary" to employ an attorney
under the circumstances prevailing. As a matter of fact, the legal
expenses of defense were even lumped with penalties and fines.
The point of view which developed is well illustrated by the cases
of Burrough Building Material Co. v. Comnmissioner7 and National
7. 47 F. 2d 178 (C. C. A. 2, 1931).
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Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering.8 In the National
Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. case the taxpayer had been named
a defendant in a civil suit by the Department of Justice for violation
of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws. The suit was terminated by the
entry of a consent decree under which the taxpayer was enjoined
from committing certain of the unlawful acts charged, but which
did not prohibit certain others. (A later finding by The Board of
Tax Appeals was that two-fifths of the alleged unlawful acts were
prohibited and three-fifths not.) The Court refused to permit the
taxpayer to deduct that portion of the legal expenses allocable to the
unlawful acts. It said:
If it is never necessary to violate the law in managing a busi-
ness, it cannot be necessary to resist a decree in equity forbidding
violations, except in cases where an injunction is unjustified.
In the Burrough's case, the taxpayer, a New York Corporation,
pleaded guilty in a criminal case to a violation of the New York
Anti-Trust Statute and was fined a substantial amount. It claimed
that the fines as well as its legal fees and costs were deductible.
The Court, denying the deduction, lumped the legal fee with the
fines, saying:
8. 89 F. 2d 878 (C. C. A. 2, 1937); see also General Outdoor Advertising
Co. v. Helvering, 89 F. 2d 882 (C. C. A. 2, 1937). The taxpayer was charged
with illegal price fixing in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the
Clayton Act. At the trial the taxpayer was acquitted on three charges and
found guilty on two charges. It was allowed to deduct three-fifths of its
legal expenses. In Commissioner v. Continental Screen Co., 58 F. 2d 625
(C. C. A. 6, 1932) the taxpayer incurred substantial legal expenses in connec-
tion with a proceeding brought against it by the Federal Trade Commission
on the ground that it was operating in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. After a hearing, the complaint was dismissed, and the expenses were
allowed as a deduction from income. The Court considered that the circum-
stances required the employment of attorneys, saying:
In the absence of a statement of all the evidence submitted to the Board
we must accept its findings as conclusive (Coinmr. v. Continental Screen
Co., 53 F. 2d 210, C. C. A. 6; Cogar v. Commnr., 44 F. 2d 554, 556 (2 U. S.
T. C. § 605), C. C. A. 6; Evergreen Cemetery As'n v. Burnet, 45 F. 2d
667 (2 U. S. T. C. § 620), C of A., D. C.) and when the applicable test
(Kornhauser v. U. S., 276 U. S. 145, 152, 153) (1 U. S. T. C. § 284)
is applied thereto we have no doubt as to the correctness of the Board's
decision. The proceeding before the Trade Commission was undoubtedly
an "action" against respondent which was "directly connected with" or
which "proximately resulted" from its business. To respondent's board
of directors the situation was ominous. The life of the business was en-
dangered. Under such circumstances respondent followed the very na-
tural and ordinary procedure suggested by the vital necessity of the situa-
tion. It employed counsel to protect its interest and agreed to pay for
their services. Any other course upon the part of its board of directors
would have been unusual and would, no doubt, have subjected them to
well founded criticism by its stockholders.
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If the fines and costs cannot be deducted, the legal expenses
incurred in litigating the question whether the taxpayer violated
the law and whether fines should be imposed should naturally
fall with the fines themselves.
This refusal to distinguish between legal expenses and penalties is
repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Heininger case. But in jus-
tifying the Court's attitude prior to the Heininger decision, Judge
Learned Hand has recently said:
Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to subsidize the obduracy
of those offenders who were unwilling to pay without a contest
and who therefore added impenitence to their offence; and for
this reason in the decisions just cited we held that such legal
expenses were never deductible.9
This "justification" presupposes that a defendant is guilty, and does
not give him, taxwise, the right to defend himself. It is this view
which led to the holding that an expense cannot be "ordinary and
necessary" unless the events leading up to the employment of the
lawyer were usual and normal.
In Welch v. Helvering'° the Supreme Court temporarily came
back to the view it had expressed in the Korithauser case. There
the Court held that debt repayments by the taxpayer, of debts of a
corporation formerly-owned by-him, made to help reestablish his
credit with certain customers, were not "ordinary and necessary"
and therefore were not deductible. But the discussion of what is
"ordinary and necessary" was authoritative and the Tax Court-and
lower federal courts since then have always cited this case for any
discussion of the question. The Court said that the phrase must
be interpreted "according to the ways of conduct and the forms of
speech prevailing in the business world". In reaching the conclu-
sion that the payments in that case were not ordinary and necessary
the Court said:
Men do at times pay the debts of others without legal obliga-
tion or the lighter obligation imposed by the usages of trade
or by neighborly amenities, but they do not do so ordinarily,
not even though the result might be to heighten their reputa-
tion for generosity and opulence. Indeed, if language is to
be read in its natural and common meaning, [citing cases] we
should have to say that payment in such circumstances, instead
9. Jerry Rossman Corporation v. Commissioner, 175 F. 2d 711 (C. C. A. 2,
July 1949).
10. 290 U. S. 111, 54 Sup. Ct. 8, 78 L. Ed. 212 (1933).
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of being ordinary is in a high degree extraordinary. There is
nothing ordinary in the stimulus evoking it, and none in the
response.
Here the Court was talking about the circumstances of the payments
(which were claimed as a deduction), and when it said that it was
not usual for one to pay the debts of another, it did not consider
or discuss the circumstances giving rise to the debts of the corpora-
tion which were paid by the taxpayer. No one can quarrel with
this conclusion. It is not usual, and therefore not ordinary and
necessary, for one to pay the debts of another.
But a few years later in the case of Deputy v. duPontn the Court
held that regardless of whether the expense claimed as a deduction
is usual, the circumstances giving rise to the expense must be ordi-
nary and necessary. There the taxpayer, Pierre S. duPont, borrowed
shares of stock of the duPont Company in order to sell them to
junior executives of the company, pursuant to agreements between
the taxpayer and the junior executives. (The Company apparently
could not lawfully sell its stock to the executives.) By borrowing
the shares he incurred heavy expenses (principally in making up
to the owner the dividends which had been paid on the stock during
the period of the loan) which he claimed as a deductible expense.
The Court did not consider whether it was usual for the borrower
of stock to make up to the owner the dividends paid on that stock
during the loan. Nor did the Court consider whether it was usual
for large stockholders of a company to borrow additional stock to
sell to junior executives. It said that it was not "ordinary and neces-
sary" for a stockholder even though a large one, to lend his aid to
the financing of stock purchases by employees of the corporation.
The Court said:
The record does not show . . . that a stockholder engaged in
conserving and enhancing his estate ordinarily makes short
sales or similarly assists his corporation in financing stock pur-
chase plans for the benefit of its executives.
This case reflects the reasoning found in the National Outdoor Ad-
vertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering case, supra, and requires that
the initial cause of the expense (here, the stock purchase agree-
ments with the junior executives) be "ordinary and necessary",
rather than the expense under the circumstances prevailing (expense
of borrowing stock to meet the agreements). Logically, if financing
stock purchase agreements with junior executives could have been
11. 308 U. S. 488, 60 Sup. Ct 363, 84 L. Ed. 416 (1940).
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regarded as a proper business activity of the taxpayer the deduc-
tion should have been allowed. It would seem "normal" for the
borrower of stock to make up to the lender what dividends he has
missed as a result of the loan.
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court in the Heininger case,
supra, met this question head-on and held directly that the usualness
or normalcy of the circumstances giving rise to the expense was
unimportant, so long as the expense was "ordinary and necessary"
under the circumstances then prevailing. There the Postmaster
General, after an investigation, issued an order to Mr. Heininger
to show cause why he should not be deprived of the use of the
mails in the conduct of his business. Mr. Heininger was engaged
in the mail order sale of dental plates, but it was claimed that his
advertising was fraudulent and that he was using the mails for
the purpose of defrauding the public. After a series of battles be-
fore the Postmaster and in the courts, Mr. Heininger was enjoined
from the use of the mails in connection with the conduct of his
business. Mr. Heininger had incurred very substantial legal ex-
penses in this prolonged litigation and deducted these expenses from
income in filing his tax return. The Commissioner, upheld by the
Tax Court and the Circuit Court, refused to permit these deduc-
tions, saying that it was not "ordinary and necessary" for the tax-
payer to conduct his business in such an illegal manner and also
saying that the deductions would clearly be against public policy.
The Supreme Court, however, decided otherwise. The Court said
that when a taxpayer's business was threatened with destruction,
it was "ordinary and necessary" for him to hire a, lawyer and pay
legal fees. But as later proceedings showed, the taxpayer had been
conducting a lawful business in an unlawful manner. Of course
it was not ordinary and necessary for the taxpayer to conduct his
business in an unlawful manner, but it was ordinary and necessary
for him to incur legal expenses to defend his business from attack
because of the manner in which it had been conducted. The Hen-
inger opinion made it abundantly clear that what must be "ordinary
and necessary" was the necessity for the employment of counsel
under the circumstances prevailing. It was argued by the Bureau
and held by the Tax Court that it was not ordinary and necessary for
the taxpayer to use fraudulent advertising for the sale of his pro-
ducts through the mail. The Supreme Court however, refused to
accept this argument and said that it was ordinary and necessary,
i. e., normal, for a taxpayer to defend himself and his business
from a charge of fraudulent practices.
8
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Despite this clear statement by the Supreme Court in the Hein-
inger case, two recent decisions by the Courts of Appeal, of the
Seventh and the Second Circuits, have fallen back into the "fallacy"
of the government's argument in the Heininger case. In Commis-
sioner v. Heide,12 and Commissioner v. Josephs,18 the Courts re-
fused to allow trustees to deduct their legal expenses in defending
themselves from charges of breach of trust. The stated reason,
in each case, for disallowing the deduction was that it was not "ordi-
nary and necessary" for a trustee to commit a breach of trust.
The decisions of the Circuit Courts in those cases can only be
explained by the fact that the trustees had already repaid to the
principal of the trusts the amounts which it was claimed the trustees
had lost by the breaches of their fiduciary duties. The theory of
the Court in the Heininger case-that the taxpayer was not bound
to assume guilt until he was proved guilty -conceivably would not
apply in that situation, since a repayment by trustees would indi-
cate that the trustees assumed they had been at fault. The extent
to which the Tax Court regarded the admonition of -the Supreme
Court in the Heininger case is illustrated by the fact that the Tax
Court, in the Heide and Josephs cases, regarded the Heininger case
as authority for it to allow deductions for the amounts repaid to
the trusts by the trustees, in addition to their legal expenses.
The Tax Court has properly, under the Heininger decision, con-
sidered the test of what is "ordinary and necessary" to be what is
normal and usual under the circumstances. Since an "ordinary and
necessary" expense is now deductible, regardless of whether it is
in a taxpayer's "trade or business", the legal expense resulting from
income tax disputes or litigation, or even advice, is uniformly
allowed as a proper deduction on the ground that the expense al-
ways concerns taxable income.14 Certainly it would not be accepted
12. 165 F. 2d 699 (C. C. A. 2, 1948).
13. 168 F. 2d 233 (C. C. A. 8, 1948).
14. In Commack v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 467, the taxpayer incurred legal
'expenses in claiming a refund of income taxes by reason of charging off a
loss of stock originally acquired for income but valueless for that purpose at
the time of the income tax dispute. It was held that the stock was originally
acquired for income production purposes and that the tax expenses were de-
ductible. In similar circumstances it was held that where the taxpayer was
unsuccessful in obtaining the tax refund, the expense was nevertheless deduc-
tible. Connelly v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 744. Wherever the taxpayer is or
would be responsible for the tax deficiency he may deduct the legal expense
on contesting the liability. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 588 (C. C. A.
5, 1948); National Association of Schools and Publishers, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 7 T: C. M. 655. See Greene Motor Co., 5 T. C. 314 holding that lawyers
and accountants' fees in connection with the settlement of claimed tax defici-
encies and penalties were deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses.
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that it is usual and customary for a taxpayer to understate his in-
come or overstate his deductions. The Tax Court has recently held
that the expenses of income tax litigation are deductible despite
the presence of facts justifying a criminal fraud action.15
The Tax Court has also held since the Heininger case that legal
fees spent in defending a company from charges of violating the
state anti-trust laws, are ordinary and necessary expenses.16  Al-
though on appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that fines
(as distinct from the legal expenses incurred in defense of the suit)
imposed against the taxpayer for violating the state anti-trust laws
could not be deducted.17 The Tax Court rejected, on the basis of
the Heininger decision, the Bureau argument that it was not normal
or usual for the taxpayer so to conduct his business that the laws
would be violated. Before the Heininger decision, the courts had
sometimes said, in denying the deduction of legal expenses in the
unsuccessful defense of d criminal action, that it would be against
public policy to allow the deduction. But the Court said, in the
Heininger case, that to deny a deduction on this ground it must
appear that the deduction would "frustrate sharply defined policies".
The Tax Court has also held, recently, that it was "ordinary and
necessary" for a lawyer to incur legal expenses in seeking to pre-
vent conviction on a charge of obstructing justice,' 8 although prior
to the Heininger case it was held that the legal expenses of an un-
successful defense in disbarment proceedings were not deductible.' 9
Today, where there is no question of public policy involved, the
"ordinary and necessary" legal expenses of a taxpayer directly con-
nected with or proximately resulting from (a) his trade or business,
(b) the production of taxable income, or (c) the management, con-
servation or maintenance of property held for the production of
income, are deductible from taxable income. Obviously no one is
going to employ an attorney unless it is necessary for him to do
so - either for legal advice, guidance or litigation. It would seem
that this fact would make a legal expense always "ordinary and
necessary", and therefore, always deductible, unless it is (a) per-
sonal, (b) capital, or (c) offends a "sharply defined public policy".
And so it does -in most cases. In one instance, however, this
15. Charles Goodman, et al. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. M. 789 (C. C. H.
Dec. 17, 867, Sept. 12, 1950).
16. Longhorn Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 310.
17. Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 184 F. 2d 276, cert.
denied 326 U. S. 728.
18. Kaufman, Morgan S. v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 1114 (1949).
19. Louis S. Levy v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. M. 226; Tinkoff v. Commissioner,
120 F. 2d 564 (C. C. A. 7, 1941).
10
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rule is "easy to state but difficult to apply". That is to say, to dis-
tinguish between an expense which is capital (not deductible) and
an expense of management, etc. of income producing property (de-
ductible) is sometimes logically impossible. In attempting to make
this distinction we meet a conflict between the statute which says
that such expenses are deductible when they are "ordinary and
necessary" and the decisions which say that such expenses when
they involve title, etc. must be capitalized. The opinion of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bowers v. Lumpkin20 illustrates
this conflict. The Courts have resolved this problem where it has
arisen, by holding that if the expense is a capital one it cannot be
"ordinary and necessary". This, in a manner of speaking, is put-
ting the cart before the horse. "Ordinary and necessary" are ad-
jectives not nouns. The word "capital" should be compared with
the words "business", "non-business" and "personal". It is both
illogical and ungrammatical to say that an expense is "capital" and
therefore cannot be "ordinary and necessary".
In the chapters that follow, the three grounds- (a) personal,
(b) capital and (c) public policy-for possible disallowance will
be considered.
2. Personal Expense:
Legal expenses in connection with personal matters are specifi-
cally not deductible under Sec. 24 (a) of the Code. "Personal" is
a word to be compared with "business" and "non-business". In its
broad sense (which apparently is the sense in which it is used in
the Code) "personal" would seem to mean all activities of a tax-
payer which are not entered into for profit or for the production
of income (taxable). Business and non-business activities seem-
ingly mean only those activities which are designed to produce tax-
able income (whether they succeed or not).
Many times legal expenses are incurred in isolated transactions,
which have nothing to do with the business or non-business activi-
ties of a taxpayer. And these expenses are almost uniformly dis-
allowed on the ground that they are personal expenses. Thus,
the cost of an action, or the defense of a suit to recover damages
for breach of promise to marry are not deductible.21 The Courts
have held as personal expenses and not deductible: Legal expenses
in obtaining or defending proceedings for a separation or a di-
20. 140 F. 2d 927 (C. C. A. 4, 1944) cert. denied 322 U. S. 755.
21. I. T. 1804, H1-2 Cuim. BuLL. 61; I. T. 2422, VII-2 Cum. BULL. 186.
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vorce;22 (However, the ruling might be different today. See dis-
cussion which follows and footnote 30); legal fees for the prepara-
tion of a will;23 obtaining release from military service;24 prose-
cuting suit for slander,25 Court costs and attorneys' fees paid in
settlement of a judgment for personal injuries resulting from an
automobile accident (unless the automobile is used for business or
income producing purposes);26 fees arising out of a will contest.
2 7
Legal expenses incurred in connection with gift tax proceedings
have been ruled deductible by a Florida District Court but have
been held non-deductible by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In the Florida case (Lykes v. United States)2 8 the taxpayer had
made gifts of stock in a family owned corporation to various mem-
bers of his family. The Commissioner greatly increased the value
of the shares shown on the taxpayer's gift tax return and deter-
mined a deficiency gift tax due of $145,276.50. The taxpayer en-
gaged an attorney who filed a petition for redetermination of the
liability with the Tax Court. Before the trial the matter was settled
on the basis of a deficiency of $15,612.75. The taxpayer then claimed,
and the Commissioner denied, that the attorney's fees in this matter
were deductible from his income under Code Sec. 23 (a) (2) as
an ordinary and necessary expense incurred for the management,
conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of
income. The District Court held that the Bingham case, supra,
was controlling and that the expense was incurred in the management,
conservation or maintenance of property held for the production
of income. The Court said that the assessment of an excessive
tax on the property required, for its conservation, the employment
of an attorney to contest such an excessive tax. Furthermore, said
the Court, the Bureau regulation to the contrary is invalid:
To construe the law as giving to the Commissioner the power
to assess a taxpayer with a deficiency tax greatly in excess of
what he owes and to hold that such law denies to the taxpayer
the right to contest such assessment, except at his own personal
expense, just isn't justice under law. The statute in question
gives the Commissioner no such power and the courts should
22. Robins v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 523; Sanderson v. Commissioner,
23 B. T. A. 304, aff'd sub. norn. Sanderson v. Burnet, 63 F. 2d 268 (C. A.
of D. C.).
23. Pennell v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 1039.
24. Seese v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 925.
25. Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F. 2d 842 (C. C. A. 7, 1932).
26. Dickason v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 496.
27. Spears v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. M. 303.
28. 84 F. Supp. 537 (D. C. FIa. 1949).
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not permit the Commissioner to write such power into the law
by a regulation adopted by him.
However, in Cobb v. Commissioner2 9 on almost similar facts the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that attorneys' fees in connec-
tion with gift taxes were not ordinary and necessary in the "manage-
ment, conservation or maintenance of property held for the produc-
tion of income". If the District Court is affirmed (and it is now
pending on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) there
will probably be a ruling on this question by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
Another question that will undoubtedly provoke litigation is the
deductibility of lawyers' fees paid in seeking or in resisting ali-
mony. Where the alimony will be taxable income to the wife,
legal fees incurred in initially obtaining the alimony or in collecting
or increasing it probably will be deductible- as should be fees in-
curred in resisting the claims. On the other hand, where the alimony
income will not be taxable to the wife, because it will be paid up
in less than ten years, is not pursuant to a decree or a written agree-
ment, it applies to the period before 1942 (when alimony payments
were made taxable to the wife, and allowed as a deduction to the
husband) or is support for children in the custody of the wife, the
legal expenses of both husband and wife should not be deductible.3 0
A safe rule to follow in considering whether the expenses of prose-
cuting or defending a non-business lawsuit relate to the production of
income and are deductible, or are personal and not deductible, is to
determine whether or not a recovery in the suit is (or would have
been if the suit had been successful) included in taxable income.
Of course recoveries in suits for breach of promise to marry, aliena-
tion of affection, non-business slander or libel, and the like, are
not taxable income and for that reason, expenses of prosecuting
such suits, whether or not they are successful, are personal and not
deductible. 31 While the statute (Code Sec. 23 (a) (2) ) authorizes
the deduction of non-trade or non-business expenses incurred in
"production of income" or the management of property held for the
"production of income", the legislative history of this section in-
29. 173 F. 2d 711, affg 10 T. C. 380, cert. denied October 10, 1949.
30. I. T. 3856, 1947-1 C. B. 23.
31. (Breach of promise to marry) Lyde McDonald v. Commissioner, 9
B. T. A. 1340; G. C. M. 4363, VII-2 Cum. BULL. 185; I. T. 2422, VII-2 Cum.
BULL. 186; I. T. 1804, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 61; (Alienation of affection) Haw-
kins v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 1023; Sol. Op. 132, I-1 CuM. BULL. 92; (Non-
business slander or libel) Sol. Op. 132 I-1 Cum. BULL. 9.2, Modf'g, S. M. 957,
1 Cum. BULL. 65.
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dicates, and the regulations of the Treasury Department require,
that the income be taxable income. The Regulation says:
Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23 (a)-15. Nontrade or nonbusiness ex-
penses. (a) In general. - Subject to the qualifications and
limitations in chapter 1 and particularly in section 24, an ex-
pense may be deducted under section 23 (a) (2) only upon
the condition that:
(1) it has been paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the
taxable year (i) for the production or collection of income,
which, if and when realized, will be required to be included in
income for Federal income tax purposes, or (ii) for the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of such income; and
(2) it is an ordinary and necessary expense for either or
both of the purposes stated in (1) above.
It would seem that the costs of defending such actions should be
-deductible under Sec. 23 (a) (2) since a judgment obtained against
the defendant could be enforced against any property, including
'income producing property, and the expense was necessary to "con-
serve" such property. But in Hexte v. CommissionerP2 the Tax
Court repudiated such a view and held that such an expense was
not deductible, despite the fact that income producing property might
have to be sold to satisfy the judgment obtained.
Sec. 23 (a) (2), authorizing the deduction of non-trade or non-
business expenses, applies, it will be noted, to expenses incurred in
the management, etc. of property held for the production of income.
Thus, it is immaterial that a non-trade or non-business legal expense
does not relate to the production of taxable income so long as it
relates to the management, conservation or maintenance of property
which is held for the production of income. In the Bingham case
it was contended by the Commissioner that the expenses were not
deductible since they did not relate to the production of taxable
income. The Court said that this fact was unimportant since the
expenses did relate to the management (i. e. the devolution) of in-
come producing property. There legal expenses were incurred by
trustees in connection with the distribution of the trust corpus to
the remaindermen. The Commissioner and the Tax Court denied
the deduction on the ground that the expense was incurred in con-
nection with the devolution of the trust property and not with the
collection of taxable income. In reversing the Bureau and the Tax
32. 3 T. C. M. 1296.
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Court, the Supreme Court said that the expenses were incurred in
the management of income producing property, because the manage-
ment of such property, under the terms of the trust, included the
final distribution of the property upon expiration of the trust, and
that this authorized the deduction. The Court said that Sec. 19.23
(a)-15 of Reg. 103, which authorized a deduction only when the
expense was in connection with the actual production of taxable in-
come, was in conflict with Code Sec. 23 (a) (2), because expenses
incurred in management, conservation or maintenance of property
held for production of income also comes within the orbit of de-
ductible non-business deductions. (The Regulation has since been
changed.)
Undoubtedly the Bureau had believed that all non-trade or non-
business expenses incurred in the management, conservation or main-
tenance of property should be capitalized or amortized, rather than
deducted from income. Probably this belief led the Treasury De-
partment to provide in its Regulation, under Sec. 23 (a) (2) of
the Code, for the deduction of non-trade or non-business expenses
only when they were incurred in connection with the production of
income. However, this view was properly repudiated by the Supreme
Court in the Bingham case. While it is true that many expenses
in the management, conservation or maintenance of property should
probably be capitalized or amortized, there are also many expenses
that are current which certainly should be deductible. The Regula-
tion, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Bingham case,
would deny the deduction of such expenses and it was proper for
the decision, to that extent, to invalidate the Regulation.
3. Capital charge rather than expense:
Perhaps the most frequent ground for the denial of a deduction
for legal expenses is that the charge is a capital one and should be
added to the tax basis of the property, or should be amortized. Where
the property is used in business or is held for investment, the addi-
tion in 1942 of Sec. 23 (a) (2) of the Code should make no differ-
ence in this regard. If an expense is a capital one, it should be added
to the tax basis of the property involved, wholly apart from the
question of whether the property is used in business, is held for
investment, or is held for personal use. For example, if legal fees
are incurred in the purchase of a residence, the expense would be
"personal", but nevertheless, it would increase the tax basis of the
15
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residence so that the gain upon subsequent disposition would be
lower by the amount of the legal fee.83
The language of Sec. 23 (a) (2) of the Code authorizes the de-
duction of "ordinary and necessary" non-trade or non-business ex-
penses incurred in the management, etc., of income producing pro-
perty. The Bingham case says that the interpretation of the phrase
"ordinary and necessary" for the purpose of determining deducti-
bility in a "trade or business" must be similar to the interpretations
of what is "ordinary and necessary" in "non-trade or non-business".
Accordingly, in the consideration of what is an "ordinary and neces-
sary" expense as distinguished from a capital charge, it is unimpor-
tant, whether the case arises under the "trade and business" sub-
division or the "non-trade and non-business" subdivision.
A most difficult question as to whether an expense is a capital
one or is "ordinary and necessary" in the conduct of a business is
where expenses are incurred in a lawsuit questioning the propriety
of business transactions, which is settled before trial. A recent de-'
cision of the Tax Court on this question is the case of Food Fair
of Virginia, Inc. v. Co"imissioner.3 4 There, shortly after the in-
corporation of-he taxpayer, another corporation commenced operat-
ing a retail grocery store, advertising and otherwise using the name
"Food Fair". This was the taxpayer's corporate name so .it sought to
enjoin the use of this name by such other corporation. Finally the
matter was settled. The taxpayer claimed that it was entitled to the
deduction of its legal expenses in seeking the injunction and working
out a settlement on the ground that the expense was incurred primari-
ly for the purpose of bringing about a discontinuance of a practice
by another corporation, which had resulted in loss of income to
the taxpayer. The Tax Court rejected this argument and held that
the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of defending or per-
fecting the taxpayer's right and title to the trade name "Food Fair".
33. Though if the property is sold for a loss, there could be no deduction
since the loss will not be recognized. I. R. C., § 23 (e) and § 112. If, on
the other hand, the property is used in business, the loss will be recognized
as a deduction from ordinary income to the extent that it exceeds gains from
other business property or capital assets. I. R. C., § 117 (j). However, if
property is used for the production of income but not in the trade or busi-
ness of the taxpayer, any loss from its disposition is deductible from gains
from the disposition of other capital assets or business property, but beyond
this, the loss is deductible to a limited extent only, in the case of individuals
and not at all in the case of corporations. (In the case of individuals such a
loss may be taken to the extent only of $1,000 per year, with a carry-over for
five years. I. R. C., § 117 (d) and (e). But for corporations, any net loss
from the disposition of a capital asset is not recognized in any event. I. R. C.,
§ 117).
34. 14 T. C .... No. 121 (June 6, 1950).
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In Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Nunan3 5 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that even though a suit disputed the taxpayer's title to
property, if the suit was settled solely to avoid unfavorable publicity
or harmful effects upon credit and the like, the expense of settling,
including attorneys' fees, were properly deductible as an "ordinary
and necessary" business expense. If, however, there was any rea-
sonable doubt as to the basis of settlement of such suit, the expense
would have to be capitalized.3 6 In the recent case of Lomas and
Nettleton Co. v. United States3 7 the Connecticut District Court held
that the expenses of settlement of a suit charging business impro-
prieties were deductible from income. There the settlement was
made primarily to protect the corporation from adverse publicity and
adverse credit reports, but the suit also questioned the taxpayer's
title to certain mortgage notes resulting from an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty. The Court citing the Hochschild case, infra, said
that where the threat to the taxpayer's title "depended for its validity
upon a claimed breach by the taxpayer of a fiduciary duty, the threat
to title is incidental only..."
The distinction between capital charges and deductible expenses
is sometimes finely drawn. This is aptly illustrated by the line of
cases in which an accounting and possibly a receivership is requested
by a former partner or business associate. In Kornhauser v. United
States,38 discussed earlier in this article, a former partner requested
an accounting from the taxpayer, claiming that compensation received
by the taxpayer after the dissolution of the partnership, was pay-
ment for services performed by the partnership. The Court held
that the legal expenses of defending this proceeding was properly
deductible as a business expense. The holding in this case has
been uniformly followed by the Tax Court -most recently in Siarto
v. Commissioner,3 9 although the petition there said that the tax-
payer's partnership interest was questioned. In both Rassenfoss v.
Commissioner40 and Marsh v. Squire4 ' the expense of defending
partnership accounting suits was allowed, although in both cases the
suit, incidentally, questioned also the taxpayer's partnership interest.
On the other hand, in Addison v. Commissioner42 the Court indicated
that where the basic legal question involved the title to property
35. 142 F. 2d 795 (C. C. A. 2, 1944)-44-1 U. S. T. C. 9333.
36. Ibid 160 F. 2d 209 (C. C. A. 2, 1947).
37. 79 F. Supp. 886 (48-2 U. S. T. C. 9362 (1948)).
38. 276 U. S. 145, 48 Sup. Ct. 219, 72 L. Ed. 505 (1 U. S. T. C. § 2841)
(1928).
39. 6 T. C. M. 3, 1947.
40. 158 F. 2d 764 (C. C. A. 7, 1946) 47-1 U. S. T. C. § 9108.
41. Unreported, D. C. W. D. Wash., 1947, (48-1 U. S. T. C. § 9142).
42. 7 T. C. M. 644.
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the expense must be capitalized, even though it incidentally raised
an accounting question for proceeds which would have been a de-
ductible expense. In Hochschild v. Commissioner4s legal expenses
of a director of a corporation in defending himself from charges
of mismanagement were allowed for deduction although Judge Frank
dissented on the ground that the suit involved taxpayer's ownership
to stock and therefore that his expenses should be capitalized. In
Potter v. Commissioner44 it was held that the legal expenses incurred
by the president and manager of a hotel corporation were deductible
where the action not only involved the corporation's property but
sought to oust the taxpayer from control and management. In Falls
v. Commissioner,45 it was held by the Tax Court that the expenses
of a suit brought against the taxpayer and others for conspiring to
infringe certain patents and for an accounting were properly allo-
cated between the capital expenses and the accounting for profits.
In Sanderson v. Burnet, supra, the legal fee, disallowed in its
entirety, included an amount for advice respecting the apportion-
ment of property between husband and wife. To that extent it was
a capital item and, though not deductible, should have increased
the tax basis of the property. In Georgia, Florida & Alabama Rail-
road Co. v. Commissioner,48 it was held that the legal fees for an
incorporation should be capitalized. Similarly as to fees to protect
the taxpayer's interest in his property ;47 legal expenses incurred in
successfully defending the legality of taxpayer's business;48 legal
expenses for recovering ownership of stock alleged to have been
taken by duress ;49 legal fees for defending the title of the taxpayer
to oil properties;5° expenses in condemnation proceedings.51 If,
however, the taxpayer is in the real estate business, expenses in
connection with condemnation may be a deductible business expense ;52
legal expenses incurred in contesting the building line of real pro-
perty constitutes a capital charge ;53 attorney's fees paid to procure
control of corporate stock for the continuance of corporate manage-
43. 161 i. 2d 817 (C. C. A. 2, 1947).
44. 20 B. T. A. 252.
45. 7 T. C. 66.
46. 31 B. T. A. 1.
47. Vernor v. U. S., 87 Ct. Cls. 435, 23 F. Supp.
48. Crane Merchandise Corp. B. T. A. memo. op., Dec. 12006-B.
49. Kane, et al. v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. M. 222.
50. North American Oil Consolidated Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 68,
rev'd on other grounds, 50 F. 2d 752 (C. C. A. 9, 1931), aff'd 286 U. S. 417.
51. Johnson & Co. v. U. S. 149 F. 2d 851; Petit v. Commissioner, 8 T. C.
228; Washington Market Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 576.
52. Reakirt v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 1296.
53. I. T. 1382, 1-2 Cum. BULLr 146.
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ment are capital expenditures; -54 attorney's fees to procure clear
title to real estate or other property,5 5 and this is true even though
the title objections are made by or through the United States Gov-
ernment.56 Where the expenses are incurred in contesting a will
so as to obtain title to and possession of property, the expenses
must be capitalized.5 7 But where the expense is incurred by a com-
mittee representing an incompetent in seeking judicial instructions
as to whether or not to contest the will, and the instructions are not
to contest, the expenses are deductible from income. The Court
indicated that if the instructions had been otherwise and property
had been obtained from the estate, the expense of the contest might
have been non-deductible as a capital charge. 58 The legal expenses
of a former owner in defense of a suit alleging fraud in the sale of
property are capital expenditures, deductible from the amount re-
ceived as payment for the property.59 Litigation expense concern-
ing the ownership of a trade name must be capitalized ;60 expense
of foreclosing liens ;61 obtaining correction deeds ;62 cost of clearing
title to stock.63 Where a life tenant incurs expenses to be capital-
ized, such expenses may be amortized over the life expectancy of
the life tenant.64  Attorney's fees in creating an inter vivos trust
must be added to the basis of the trust property and are not deduc-
tible from income.6
5
The Tax Court has consistently refused to allow deductions in
connection with incompetency proceedings. 66 Although the New
York District Court allowed an incompetent's committee to deduct
54. Lammle v. Eisner, 275 F. 504; Williamson v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A.
1112; Crowley v. Commissioner, 89 F. 2d 715 (C. C. A. 6, 1937).
55. Brawner v. Burnet, (C. A. D. C.) 63 F. 2d 129; Hewes, 2 B. T. A.
1279, Dec. 958; Tompson, Seletha, 0., 9 B. T. A. 1342, Dec. 3393 (Acq.);
Phoenix Development Co., 13 B. T. A. 414, Dec. 4338; Rentie, 21 B. T. A.
1230, Dec. 6631; Elliott Co., 45 B. T. A. 82, Dec. 12, 075; Cohen & Sons Co.,
42 B. T. A. 1137, Dec. 11, 370 (Acq.) ; Porter. Royalty Poll. Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, (C. C. A. 6) 165 F. 2d 933. Cert. dentied, 334 U. S. 833; A. R. R. 284,
3 C-208; Palmer v. Commissioner, 3 B. T. A. 403.
56. S. M. 2423, 111-2 Cum. BuLL. 157; Owens v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d
210 (C. C. A. 10, 1942, cert. denied 316 U. S. 704; Consolidated Mutual Oil
Co., 2 B. T. A. 1067; North American Oil Consolidated Co., 12 B. T. A. 68.
57. I. T. 1689, I1I Cum. BULl. 122.
58. Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 66 F. Supp. 410 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1946).
59. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. 2d 17 (C. C. A. 9, 1932).
60. L. J. Skaggs, et al. v. Commissioner, B. T. A. memo. op., Dec. 12, 517-H.
61. Shaw Hayden Building Co., 18 B. T. A. 949.
62. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 23 B. T. A. 829.
63. Ernest Smith v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. M. 7; Kane v. Commissioner, 6
T. C. M. 222.
64. Schick v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1067.
65. Matthiessen v. Commissioner, B. T. A. memo. op., Dec. 8279-E.
66. Rentie v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 1230; Hinkle v. Commissioner, 47
B. T. A. 670; McHenry v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. M. 1027.
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the legal expenses of obtaining instructions from the New York
Supreme Court on behalf of the incompetent not to elect to take
against the will of the incompetent's spouse. 67 But, as pointed out
above, the Court indicated that if the instructions had been to take
against the will, the costs of contesting might have been capital
charges.
Had the committee been authorized by the Supreme Court to
make the election, and had the exercise of that right resulted
in expenses for the vindication of the right, then, perhaps,
they would fall into the latter category. Here, however, the
committee was not yet asserting any right to property. It was
performing its duty to seek judicial instruction preliminary to
the assertion of such right.
Where the suit to acquire property is unsuccessful, there is no
property to which the expenses of the suit might be added, conse-
quently the legal fees will be regarded as a personal expense. In
McClees v. Commissioner,68 it appeared that property was left to a
named "granddaughter". In an attempt to void the bequest, in the
Probate Court, the taxpayer proved that the legatee was not the
"granddaughter" of the testator, but the Probate Court held, never-
theless, that the bequest should stand, since it was based on love
and affection. Thus, the taxpayer established his point but received
nothing from so doing, and his expenses were deemed to be per-
sonal, although they could have been capitalized if there had been
any recovery.
In determining whether a given expense is a capital charge or is
deductible, one of the most difficult problems arises where the ex-
pense was incurred in the protection of the taxpayer's title or posses-
sion to income producing property. Title defense has always been
held to be a capital charge but the expense of conserving income
producing property are deductible under the Code (if "ordinary and
necessary"). In the case of Bowers v. Lumpkin, supra, the Court
sought to avoid this problem by implying that a deductible expense
for the conservation of income producing property must be recurrent
to be *ordinary and necessary. There Mrs. Morris Lumpkin had
purchased stock of the Coca Cola Bottling Company in Columbia
from the trustees of a trust created under the will of her deceased
husband. In a suit by the Attorney General of the State of South
Carolina to set aside the sale, she had expended approximately $27,-
000 in its successful defense. The Court held that the expense was
67. Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, mtpra.
68. 4 T. C. M. 39.
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a capital charge and could not be deducted. Mrs. Lumpkin contended
that the expense was necessary "to conserve" property held for the
production of income and that the Amendment to Section 23 (a) (2)
of the Code insofar as it refers to expenses "to conserve" property
would have no meaning if the expenses were not deductible. But
the Court held that nevertheless, it was not an "ordinary and neces-
sary" expense. In implying that an "ordinary and necessary" ex-
pense must be recurrent the Court said:
But the term "conservation" can be given effect if it is limited
to expenses ordinarily and necessarily incurred during the tax-
able year for the safe-guarding of the property, such as the
cost of a safe deposit box for securities.
It would seem that this statement is erroneous. In Welch v. Helver-
ing, supra, the Supreme Court said the exact opposite.
Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments
must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer
will have to make them often. A lawsuit affecting the safety
of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees
may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the
expense is an ordinary one because we know from experience
that payments for such a purpose, whether the amount is large
or small, are the common and accepted means of defense against
attack.
The truth of the matter is that there are undoubtedly expenses neces-
sary for the conservation of income producing property which are
not necessarily involved in title defense. Although the Court may
have properly disallowed the deduction, in doing so it did not need
to limit deductible conservation expenses to those similar to the
rental of a "safe deposit box for securities". As a matter of fact,
this limitation would probably not apply in view of the Supreme
Court's decision in the Binghamn case.
While there are apparently no decisions as yet, it would seem that
legal expenses in connection with the use of business or income pro-
ducing property which do not add to the value, such as expenses
to abate a nuisance, should be deductible as an expense rather than
as a capital charge.
69
69. In Bliss v. Commissioner, 57 F. 2d 984 (C. C. A. 5; 1932) a situation
very similar to that hypothised in the text was decided. There the taxpayer
owned several thousand acres of land and an oil driller, on a claim of license,
dug oil wells on the property, some of it producing, and some of it was dry. The
taxpayer commenced two suits for the purpose of determining whether or not the
taxpayer's ownership of the land carried with it ownership of the minerals.
The suits were terminated by a final holding that the adverse claims of the well
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4. Policy considerations:
The Heininger decision prevents the denial of a deduction for
legal expenses on the general ground of public policy. Now, as-
suming it is otherwise deductible, the deduction must be permitted
unless the expense "frustrates sharply defined policies". It has
recently been said by the Tax Court that the legal expenses in-
curred by a taxpayer in order to determine whether a contract is or
is not contrary to public policy, are so "remotely connected" with
the public policy question that such fees should be deductible in any
event. In the case of Thomas B. Lilly, et al. v. Commissioner70
the Court said:
If the payments which are the subject of the present contro-
versy were merely remotely connected with contracts violating
public policy- such as fees of attorneys paid in litigation
brought to determine the question of that violation-then such
payments are deductible. But if these payments were directly
connected with contracts contravening the alleged public policy
here- payments or the promise to make which were the very
consideration of such contracts- they are not deductible as
ordinary and necessary expenses.
This is indeed a far cry from the earlier statements of courts which
are quoted in the first part of this article.
Expenses of defending a business which is per se illegal (as dis-
tinct from a legal business operated in an illegal manner) have re-
cently been disallowed. 71 The Regulations expressly deny expenses
driller were invalid. The Court held that the attorney's fees in the suits, paid
out by the taxpayer, were deductible from income on the theory that the ex-
penses were not in connection with the taxpayer's title to the land, and did
not add to the value of the property, but rather, related to the taxpayer's use
of the property. The Court said:
The above mentioned expenditures for attorney's fees cannot reasonably be
regarded as capital investment. They were not payments made in acquiring
ownership of lands minerals in or from which were adversely claimed ...
The object of the suits brought was the removal of an obstacle to the re-
covery or realization of income created by the assertion of adverse claims
to ib ... To treat as an addition to the cost of land the amount of an ex-
penditure made, after ownership was acquired, to enable the owner, his
agent or lessee to possess and use the land for business purposes, undis-
turbed by intruders or trespassers, would involve a disregard of the differ-
ence between the cost of acquiring ownership of property and expenses
paid or incurred to protect the owner's right to undisturbed possession and
enjoyment of his property, and what it yields or produces, by himself, his
agents or lessees. It seems reasonable to treat amounts expended for ser-
vices rendered in ejecting or excluding trespassers after ownership has been
acquired as expenses incident to the ownership of property and the ac-
quisition and enjoyment of income from it, rather than as additions to
the capital investment in the property.
70. 14 T. C .... No. 120, June 6, 1950.
71. Stralla, et al. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 801.
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of lobbying.72  On the other band, fees paid to an attorney for the
preparation and advocacy before state legislative committees of cer-
tain legislation which would be favorable to the taxpayer's business,
has been allowed.
73
Prior to the Heininger case the legal expenses of unsuccessfully
defending a charge of fraud had always been denied on the grounds
of public policy. Even if the suit was a civil one - not a criminal
one - the expense would not be allowed. Thus, in Standard Oil
Co. v. Commissioner74 the taxpayer had expended something over
two million dollars in compromising an alleged liability to the govern-
ment and in payment of legal fees. The suit was based on allegations
of fraud and bribery in the lease of government property, arising out
of the "Tea-Pot Dome" scandal. Although the action was a civil
one and involved business transactions, the deduction was denied
on public policy grounds.75 The Heininger decision clearly indicates
that this will no longer be the case, and the Tax Court in the Stralla
case confirmed this. Prior to the Heininger case, expenses incurred
in unsuccessfully defending a criminal prosecution were also uni-
formly disallowed.76  But if the defense was successful, and if the
matter arose in the conduct of a trade or business, the entire expense
was an allowable deduction as there was no policy consideration on
which it should be denied.77 Since the Heininger case, the legal ex-
penses of an unsuccessful defense to a criminal prosecution is an
allowable deduction, but any amounts paid to the prosecuting agency
in the way of compromise, by consent decrees or otherwise, are not
72. See Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326,
62 Sup. Ct. 272, 86 L. Ed. 249 (1941).
73. Lucas v. Wofford, 49 F. 2d 1027 (C. C. A. 5).
74. 129 F. 2d 363 (C. C. A. 7, 1942), cert. denied 317 U. S. 688.
75. The Court said:
There is involved here another question -a broader question, one of pub-
lic policy, which bars this asserted deduction . .. We have found no case
which permits a taxpayer to successfully claim a deduction paid the Gov-
ernment by way of damages which arose from a fraudulent transaction
which the said taxpayer perpetrated upon the Government.
And it is apparent that the case against the allowance of deductions is
strengthened, if the facts warrant a finding that the taxpayer made pay-
ment to the Government, not alone because of fraud, but because of criminal
corruption, to-wit, bribery.
The fact that the instant judgment was for damages arising out of a tort
against the Government, distinguishes it from cases where the damages
arise out of a tort against an individual. Add to this, the distinguishing
fact, that the tort in this case arises out of bribery and not a lesser degree
tort, like negligence, we can more readily see the necessity of applying
the defense of "against public policy".
76. Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F. 2d 373.
77. Commissioner v. Continental Screen Co., 58 F. 2d 625 (C. C. A. 6,
1932).
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deductible. 78 This rule has even extended to proceedings which were
not, but were closely akin to criminal prosecutions.
Under the Heininger case, policy considerations should be used in
tax cases to discourage the perpetration of a wrong, but not to dis-
courage bona fide (albeit unsuccessful) attempts by a taxpayer to
disprove accusations of wrong. Thus, a distinction should be drawn
under the Heininger case between expenses properly incurred by
the taxpayer in attempting bona fidely to disprove charges of
wrong doing against him, and expenses which he incurs as a conse-
quence of his wrong doing.79 In the Heide and Josephs" cases supra,
this distinction was not made and as a consequence the entire ex-
pense, both in attempting to disprove the charges against the trustees
and repayments which those trustees were required to make as a
result of the legal proceedings, were disallowed as deduction. Under
the Heininger case however, the legal expenses of the trustees in
attempting to disprove the charges against them should have been
deductible.
CONCLUSION
Before 1942 the legal expenses of an individual, other than busi-
ness expenses, were in no case deductible. The 1942 Amendment
to the Code, authorizing the deduction of expenses incurred in the
production of income or in the management, etc. of investment pro-
perty, made the deduction of legal expenses for individuals outside
of a trade or business co-extensive with those authorized in a trade
or business. This Amendment coupled with the Heininger and the
Bingham decisions now authorizes the deduction of all legal ex-
penses, where there is no violation of a "sharply defined" public
policy, except those relating to personal matters and those which
have to be capitalized. The Heininger case repudiated the theory
that "ordinary and necessary" refers to the reason for the expense
- and pointed out that the phrase properly refers to the expense
under the circumstances prevailing. There the Bureau argued and
the Tax Court held that it was not ordinary for Heininger to sell
false teeth with fraudulent advertising. But the Supreme Court
said that this was not the point -that the question was whether it
was ordinary and necessary for Heininger to defend his business
from the fraudulent advertising charges. The Bingham case held
78. Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 871; aff'd 171 F.
2d 294, cert. denied 336 U. S. 962; Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Ce-
ment Co., 148 F. 2d 276 (C. C. A. 5, 1945).
79. See the discussion in the case of Jerry Rossman Corporation v. Commis-
sioner, stupra.
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that the non-business deductions under the Amendment were in pari
materia with the business deductions, and that therefore the Heining-
er decision is equally applicable to non-business as to business de-
ductions.
The Bingham case is important also because of its interpretation
of the management of property held for the production of income.
There the Court held that the phrase means the management of
property in its broad sense - that is, as including distribution which,
if considered as a segregated transaction, would not be regarded as
management. The Bureau, considering its argument in the Bingham
case and its Regulations prior to that decision, evidently considered
that all expenses in the management, conservation, or maintenance
of property should be capital expenses and not deductible, despite
the Code provisions. The Court, in the Bingham case, said that not
only was this contrary to the language of the Code, but it also dis-
regarded the established fact that many expenses of managing, etc.
property in no way add to or enhance the value of, or concern the
taxpayer's ownership of such property.
The distinction between an expense which is deductible and one
which must be capitalized in many situations is most elusive. Where
the principal relief sought by the action is an accounting or relief
from mal-administration by the taxpayer, but the taxpayer's title
to property is incidentally raised, as in the Hochschild case, supra,
or in the Lonuzs and Nettleton case, supra, the expense will be al-
lowed. But, as the Court implied in the Addison case, supra, if the
title to the property is the principal question and the accounting is
incidental thereto, the entire expense will be capitalized. Probably
the most appropriate method of dealing with this situation, is to al-
locate the expense between those relating to business, the collection
of income or the management, conservation or maintenance of income
producing property, and those expenses relating to the retention or
perfection of title to the property.
If a deduction is not allowed because of policy considerations, as
in the Heide and Josephs' cases, a distinction must be made based
on differences of degree and not of kind.8 0 Where the expense was
incurred in the defense of a proceeding in which the taxpayer is
charged with conducting an illegal business, or conducting a lawful
business in such a manner as obviously to disregard the rights of
other persons, the expense will probably not be allowed as a deduc-
tion. It is unlikely that, in such circumstances, the Courts will wish
80. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 54 Sup. Ct 8, 78 L. Ed. 212
(1933).
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to lend encouragement to a defense by protecting the taxpayer from
paying income taxes upon the sums expended by him for his de-
fense. The Courts will probably feel that, as Judge Learned Hand
said in the Jerry Rossman Corporation case, supra, to allow the de-
duction would subsidize the obduracy of offenders unwilling to pay
without a contest, and would add "impenitence to their offense". On
the other hand, if the defense is bona fide, the Courts will be un-
likely to impose the additional hardship of making the sums expended
for defense subject to tax, accordingly the expense will probably be
allowed as a deduction. As the Court said in the Heininger case:
So far as appears from the record respondent did not believe,
nor under our system of jurisprudence was he bound to believe,
that a fraud order destroying his business was justified by the
facts or the law. Therefore he did not voluntarily abandon the
business but defended it by all available legal means ... to deny
the deduction would attach a serious punitive consequence to
the Postmaster General's finding which Congress has not ex-
pressly or impliedly indicated should result from such a finding.
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